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Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) is the source of each individual's
genetic makeup. The fact that each person's DNA is unique (with the
exception of identical twins) and does not change over time (with the
exception of mutations') makes it a useful identification tool.
Scientific advances have led to the creation of DNA databases that
serve various purposes, including clinical research on personalized
medicine, genetic testing to determine if a person has or is likely to
get or be a carrier of a genetic condition, providing certainty in
paternity disputes, and ancestry tests to identify ancestors who lived
over 200,000 years ago. This paper will focus on the use of DNA
databases by law enforcement to identify victims, missing persons,
and perpetrators of crimes.
The molecular structure of DNA was discovered in 1950, and
DNA typing was first applied in criminal cases in the 1980s. By the
turn of the century, all fifty states had established DNA databases for
individuals convicted of certain offenses.
* Candice Roman-Santos is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of California
Hastings College of the Law, Class of 2010. She will be graduating with Pro Bono
recognition as a member of the Pro Bono Society and a Certificate in Law, Science &
Health Policy from the University of California, San Francisco. She earned a Bachelor of
Science degree in Integrated Science and Technology with a dual-concentration in
Biotechnology and Engineering & Manufacturing from James Madison University, Class
of 2001. The author would like to extend her sincerest gratitude to Lisa S. Faigman for
inspiring this piece and for her continued support and friendship.
1. "Virtually every single person will have some sort of change to their DNA during
their life. Changes can result from a multitude of mistakes, such as an error when DNA is
replicated or through damage to DNA occurring from environmental or lifestyle factors.
A DNA mutation can also be inherited." Explore DNA, What are DNA Mutations,
http://www.exploredna.co.uk/what-dna-mutations.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
[267]
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The establishment of DNA databases has been and continues to
be a source of controversy. Proponents of DNA databases argue that
DNA profiles can be obtained from very small amounts of genetic
data, the database supports a discipline that does not rely on
subjective judgments and interpretations, and expanding the database
will help to solve more crimes, exonerate innocent people who have
been wrongly convicted, and reduce the need to reverse previous
miscarriages of justice. Opponents of DNA databases argue that
DNA analysis is not infallible, that providing personal information is
governed by individual consent and should not be based on a
mandatory provision, and that there is a risk that DNA will be used to
the exclusion of material that might prove the innocence of the
suspect. The enactment of DNA database statutes has stirred public
debate about the relevant policy issues, such as: 1) who should be
included, 2) what information should be included, 3) whether DNA
samples should remain stored or be destroyed, and 4) whether DNA
samples and records should be used for other purposes. All of these
issues revolve around the single ethical concern of privacy. DNA
identifies not only the person in question but also thousands of
genetic conditions and predispositions to disease. Even if the DNA
profiles that comprise a DNA database only include numbers that are
irrelevant for other purposes, the fact that DNA samples can be
stored indefinitely raises concerns regarding the temptation to use
those samples for new and unidentified purposes. This risk is too
great to ignore.
First, I will discuss DNA's use in modern forensics and why it is a
valuable resource in criminal investigations. Second, I will discuss the
three largest DNA databases in the world: 1) The Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), 2)
The United Kingdom's (UK) National DNA Database (NDNAD),
and 3) The California DNA Database. Third, I will discuss the
process of obtaining a "cold hit" within CODIS and the problems
surrounding related probabilities and statistics that can mislead juries
and courts. Fourth, I will discuss DNA database statutes in the
United States (U.S.), how legal challenges to such statutes have been
resolved, the unique issues related to requiring DNA samples from
mere arrestees, and the significant problems that may arise due to
poor implementation of such statutes. Fifth, I will discuss the main
arguments for and against expanding DNA databases. Lastly, I will
focus on the issues of privacy surrounding DNA, the implications of
reusing information obtained for one purpose for new and
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unidentified purposes, and the concerns about function creep and
misuse of personal information.
II. DNA Basics
James Watson and Francis Crick revealed a breakthrough
discovery when they suggested that the structure of DNA has two
helical chains each coiled around the same axis.2 Moreover, their
research suggested a possible copying mechanism for the genetic
material. The progression of science further revealed that human
beings are 99.99% genetically similar and each individual is
differentiated by 0.01% of DNA.4  An individual's DNA can be
decoded to reveal a pattern that is shared only by a genetically
identical twin. In addition, DNA does not change over time, except
in the case of mutations.'
Each human being starts out as a fertilized egg with 46
chromosomes (23 chromosomes from each parent). The DNA in
these chromosomes is composed of pairs of molecules called "bases,"
and a particular order of bases that code for an observable
characteristic is called a "gene."" A gene's position on a chromosome
is called its "locus."9 Several different arrangements of bases can
form the same gene, and these variations are called "alleles.""o DNA
identification is based on how alleles of genes differ from one
individual to another."
III. DNA Forensics
Using DNA for identifying victims, perpetrators, missing
persons, and others relies on DNA regions with short repeat units,
2. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, NATURE, Apr.
25, 1953, at 737, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/dna50/watsoncrick.pdf.
3. Id.
4. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FORENSIC DNA
FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE PROSECUTOR 3-4 (2003).
5. OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, PLAYING THE GENE CARD?: A REPORT ON RACE AND
HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (Center for Genetics and Society) (2009).
6. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 152
(David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004).
7. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS § 2.22
(Student ed. 2008).
8. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 4-5.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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called Short Tandem Repeats (STRs).12 In 1996, the FBI established
13 STR loci as the standard for human identification, which is
recognized both domestically and internationally." Forensic scientists
use data from the 13 loci to create a DNA profile, and the prevailing
statistical probability that any two unrelated persons have identical
DNA profiles at 13 loci is one in several billion.14
Forensic applications of DNA technology include identifying
potential suspects based on an individual's DNA matching crime
scene evidence, exonerating those who have been wrongly convicted
of a crime, identifying crime and catastrophe victims, and establishing
paternity and other familial relationships.'
A. How DNA is Obtained
Crime scene investigators can obtain blood, semen, urine, hairs,
saliva, and other evidence, known as an evidence sample, that can
yield a DNA profile." A reference sample, such as blood from a
suspect, is then obtained and analyzed to create another DNA profile,
which is ultimately compared against crime scene evidence DNA
profiles to determine whether there is a genetic match - the DNA
profile obtained from the evidence sample and the reference sample
are indistinguishable.17 Genetic matches can convince the trier-of-fact
in a courtroom that the two samples share a common source.
The preferred method of obtaining a reference sample is a buccal
swab - using a small brush or cotton swab to collect a sample of cells
from the inside surface of the cheek - because it reduces the
possibility of contamination."' The buccal swab is an easy and rapid
single-step process as opposed to other methods that often require
multiple steps.'" Each additional procedural step creates another
12. DNA Diagnostics Center, Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), http://www.
forensicdnacenter.com/dna-str.html (last visited April 19, 2010).
13. Id.
14. OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 32.
15. Human Genome Project, DNA Forensics, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
HumanGenome/elsi/forensics.shtml (last visited April 19, 2010).
16. See DNA Diagnostics Center, Forensic Services FAQs, http://www.
forensicdnacenter.com/forensic-faqs.html (last visited April 19, 2010).
17. Charles H. Brenner, Forensic Mathematics of DNA Matching (1999), available at
http://dna-view.com/profile.htm.
18. Id.
19. See CHANTEL MARIE GIAMANCO, COLLECTING A BUCCAL SWAB -AN ART OR
A CINCH? (Human Identification Technologies, Inc.) (2009) http://www.hitdna.com/assets
/pdfs%202009/Publications/Taking%20a%2OBuccal %20Swab_04.2008.pdf.
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opportunity for human error. Contamination can be easily avoided
by collecting the sample in a low traffic area and requiring the
collector to wear a mask and refrain from talking while taking the
swab.2' If a buccal swab is not an available option, other methods
may be used to collect a sample of blood, saliva, semen, or other
appropriate fluid or tissue from personal items (e.g., hair brush) or
from stored samples (e.g., banked sperm).
B. DNA Typing
The goal of the forensic scientist is to establish the genetic
profile, or "genotype," of an individual by discovering which alleles
exist at strategically selected loci.1
In 2003, President George W. Bush created the Advancing
Justice Through DNA Technology Initiative, which was a mandate on
the Attorney General to improve the use of DNA in the criminal
justice system.2 The website dedicated to this initiative explains how
samples obtained from crime scenes are subjected to defined
processes involving biology, technology, and genetics:
"Following collection of biological material from a crime scene
or paternity investigation, the DNA is first extracted from its
biological source material and then measured to evaluate the
quantity of DNA recovered. After isolating the DNA from its
cells, specific regions are copied with a technique known as the
polymerase chain reaction, or PCR. PCR produces millions of
copies for each DNA segment of interest and thus permits very
minute amounts of DNA to be examined. Multiple STR
regions can be examined simultaneously to increase the
informativeness of the DNA test ...
The resulting PCR products are then separated and detected in
order to characterize the STR region being examined. The
separation methods used today include slab gel and capillary
electrophoresis (CE). Fluorescence detection methods have
greatly aided the sensitivity and ease of measuring PCR-
amplified STR alleles. After detecting the STR alleles, the
number of repeats in a DNA sequence is determined ...
20. Id.
21. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 2.
22. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, ADVANCING JUSTICE THROUGH DNA TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2003), http://www.justice.gov/ag/dnapolicybook-exsum.htm.
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The resulting DNA profile for a sample, which is a combination
of individual STR genotypes, is compared to other samples. In
the case of a forensic investigation, these other samples would
include known reference samples such as the victim or suspects
that are compared to the crime scene evidence.. . If there is not
a match between the questioned sample and the known sample,
then the samples may be considered to have originated from
different sources. If a match or 'inclusion' results, then a
comparison of the DNA profile is made to a population
database, which is a collection of DNA profiles obtained from
unrelated individuals of a particular ethnic group."2
Once a genetic match is declared, a statistic is generated to
convey how common or rare the matched genetic profile is in the
general population (also known as the random match probability
(RMP)).2 This statistic is typically a very small number, which can
help the prosecutor secure a conviction, but it may also mislead the
jury in the process. This will be further explored in a later section.
IV. DNA Databases
The three largest DNA databases in the world, in decreasing
order, are: 1) CODIS; 2) NDNAD; and 3) the California DNA
Database.25
A. United States
In 1994, the Director of the FBI was authorized to establish an
index of: 1) DNA identification records; 2) analyses of DNA samples
recovered from crime scenes; 3) analyses of DNA samples recovered
from unidentified human remains; and 4) analyses of DNA samples
voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons.26 The
national DNA database relies on the FBI's CODIS software, which
provides a central database of the DNA profiles from all public
forensic DNA laboratories throughout the country. 27 The FBI
23. DNA Initiative, Steps in DNA Sample Processing,
http://www.dna.gov/basics/analysis/steps (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
24. Edward Humes, Guilt by the Numbers, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=900572&evid=1.
25. Office of the Attorney General, News Release: Brown Announces Elimination of
DNA Data Bank Backlog, Sep. 10, 2007, available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/
release.php?id=1464&.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(a) (West 2009).
27. DNA Initiative, Combined DNA Index System, http://www.dna.gov/dna-
databases/codis (last visited April 19, 2010).
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provides CODIS software for free to all public forensic laboratories,
but each laboratory is responsible for their own computer hardware
and all support software.28 CODIS is comprised of two indexes: 1)
convicted offender index of DNA profiles from convicted criminals or
arrestees pursuant to individual state statutes, and 2) forensic index of
DNA profiles from crime scene evidence.2 9 DNA samples from
victims are not permitted in CODIS.3" An individual's DNA profile
must be promptly expunged from the national DNA database if his or
her conviction was overturned or if the charge has been dismissed,
resulted in an acquittal, or if no charge was filed)'
Local laboratories can maintain their own local DNA index
system (LDIS) and then upload approved profiles to the state
database.32 The state DNA index system (SDIS) contains profiles
from local laboratories in that state, profiles analyzed by the state
laboratory itself, and profiles from convicted offenders and mere
arrestees (depending on specific state statutes). In addition, the FBI
is responsible for obtaining samples in the federal prison system and
entering those profiles into CODIS.34  In this sense the FBI is
functioning as a state laboratory." Profiles from the states and the
FBI are then uploaded into the national DNA index system (NDIS).3 6




30. Chris Asplen & Lisa Hurst, Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs,
Presentation at the National Conference for the National Center for Victims of Crime
called "DNA Technology: Impact on Victims, Public Safety, and Possibilities for the
Future" (Jun. 20, 2007).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2009).
32. DNA Initiative, Levels of the Database, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/codis





37. DNA Initiative, Levels of the Database, http://www.dna.gov/dna-databases/codis
(last visited April 19, 2010).
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A weekly search is conducted of all DNA profiles in the NDIS,
and resulting profile matches are automatically returned to
laboratories that submitted them." As of April 2010, the NDIS
contained over 7,940,321 offender profiles and 306,028 forensic
profiles, and CODIS had produced over 107,600 hits assisting in more
than 109,900 investigations) The NDIS is comprised of 3 federal
databases, 50 state databases, and over 70 local databases.4
B. United Kingdom
The NDNAD, created in 1995 in England and Wales, was the
world's first DNA database. 4' Although no specific legislation
established the NDNAD, legislation has since specified allowable
sources of DNA samples. The NDNAD contains the largest number
of DNA profiles in terms of the proportion of the population - 5.2%
of the UK population as opposed to 0.5% of the U.S. population in
the NDIS. 42 As of April 10, 2010, the NDNAD contained 4,856,902
DNA profiles of individuals and 354,132 DNA profiles from crime
*43scene evidence.
38. DNA Initiative, Capabilities of CODIS Software, http://www.dna.gov/dna-
databases/software (last visited April 19, 2010).
39. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.
gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited April 18, 2010).
40. Tim Schellberg, Gordon Thomas Honeywell Governmental Affairs, Presentation
at the ISFE Conference called "Forensic DNA Databases: A Global Update" (Nov. 10,
2009).
41. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, The National DNA Database,
POSTNOTE, February 2006, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/
POSTpn258.pdf.
42. Id.
43. National Policing Improvement Agency, Statistics, http://www.npia.police.uk/en/
13338.htm (last visited April 19, 2010).
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The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act was passed in 1994
and authorized the creation of the NDNAD. 44  Initially, the Act
allowed the police to obtain DNA samples without consent only from
those charged with a recordable offense. 45 However, legislation has
continually expanded police powers to take and retain DNA samples,
with the goal of including "virtually the entire active criminal
population" in the NDNAD. 46 For example, a 2001 law in England
and Wales provided authorization to permanently retain DNA
profiles and DNA samples from people who are merely arrested but
subsequently acquitted or not prosecuted.4  The scope and usage of
the NDNAD has raised serious concerns and, not surprisingly, has led
to legal challenges. In November 2004 the Court of Appeal ruled that
the police can retain DNA samples and profiles from people who
were never convicted of a crime because the relatively minor invasion
- * 48of privacy is justified by the legitimate aim of preventing crime.
However, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled
in 2008 that keeping DNA samples and profiles of innocent people is
unlawful and violates Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life). 49
Despite the call to destroy the DNA records of people who are
currently in the NDNAD and have been found innocent of any crime,
police officers are being advised to ignore the ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights.!"
C. California
In November 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69, the
DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act.5'
Prior to the passage of Proposition 69, California law required the
permanent retention of DNA samples from only convicted felons
44. Hellen Wallace, The UK National DNA Database: Balancing Crime Detection,
Human Rights and Privacy, 7 EMBO REPORTS S26, S26 (2006), available at http://
www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1490298/pdf/7400727.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Wallace, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. BBC News, Police Can Keep Suspects' DNA, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk news/2254053.stm (last visited April 19, 2010).
49. Id.
50. Ligali, Police Illegally Obtaining DNA to Create Pre-Crime Suspects,
http://www.ligali.org/article.php?id=2024 (last visited April 19, 2010).
51. Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Proposition 69 (DNA),
http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/prop69.php (last visited on Nov. 29, 2009).
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involving serious, violent crimes.52 Proposition 69 amended California
law to significantly expand the California DNA Database by also
including people convicted of non-violent felonies (including
juveniles) and individuals arrested on any felony charge, which was
estimated to increase state costs by nearly $20 million annually.B A
critique of Proposition 69 recognizes several areas where it is highly
problematic. First, the law's inappropriate treatment of arrestees and
* 54suspects undermines the presumption of innocence principle.
Second, the law is likely to exacerbate racial bias due to pretextual
behavior by law enforcement.5 Third, the law is likely to increase
human errors in DNA testing because laboratories will be
overwhelmed with trying to implement the new law. Fourth, the law
creates the potential for misuse due to the lack of privacy
protections." Fifth, the substantial costs will ultimately be paid by
California taxpayers.
As of April 2010, the California DNA Database contained
1,251,307 offender profiles and 25,323 forensic samples, and has aided
in 12,412 investigations. 9
V. Cold Hits, Probabilities, and Access to CODIS
A cold hit is defined as a match between a forensic DNA profile
and a known person or offender profile." This means that an
individual is identified solely by DNA and not through any other
suspicion." Matches across all 13 standard loci are known as full
matches and matches across fewer than 13 loci are known as partial
matches.62 The FBI accepts partial DNA profiles of at least ten loci
52. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases (Part 1), 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199 (2006).
53. League of Women Voters of California Education fund, Pro & Con Analysis of
Proposition 69, http://ca.1wv.org/lwvc/edfund/elections/2004nov/pc/prop69.html (last
visited April 19, 2010).





59. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS-NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/codis/stats.htm#California (last visited April 19, 2010).
60. OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 34.
61. LINDA L. MCCABE & EDWARD R. B. MCCABE, DNA: PROMISE AND PERIL 119
(2008).
62. OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 35.
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for inclusion in the NDIS, and partial matches are being used more
frequently as incriminating evidence.3 If the amount of DNA
recovered from a crime scene is very small or if the DNA sample
recovered from a crime scene is either degraded or a mixture of DNA
from many individuals, then there is often much less than 13 loci
available for comparison.64 Therefore, the statistical weight attached
to a match is lower and the probability of a coincidental match is
higher.
Bicka Barlow, a California attorney with both a law degree and a
Masters in genetics, learned that Arizona's DNA database contained
two people whose genetic profiles matched at 9 loci, and filed a
subpoena to learn more." The resulting report revealed that, out of
65,493 offenders in Arizona's DNA database in 2005, 122 pairs of
people had genetic profiles matching at 9 loci, 20 pairs matched at 10
loci, 1 pair of siblings matched at 11 loci, and 1 pair of siblings
matched at 12 loci. Similar assessments of DNA databases have
been conducted in Illinois and Maryland.'" Out of 220,000 profiles in
the Illinois state database, 903 pairs matched at 9 or more loci, and
out of 30,000 profiles in the Maryland state database, 32 pairs
matched at nine loci and 3 pairs matched on all 13 loci.'9 How is this
possible if the prevailing statistical probability that any two unrelated
persons have identical DNA profiles at 13 loci is one in several
billion?70
The RMP for the 122 profiles that matched at 9 loci in Arizona's
DNA database was reported to be "1 in 754 million in Caucasians, 1
in 561 billion in African Americans, and 1 in 113 trillion in Southwest
63. Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?: Deciding When DNA Alone is Enough to
Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 7); OBASOGIE, supra note
5, at 35.
64. Linda Geddes, Unreliable Evidence? Time to Open Up DNA Databases, NEW
SCIENTIST, Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20527424.700-
unreliable-evidence-time-to-open- up-dna-databases.html?full =true.
65. Id.
66. Jon Jefferson, Cold Hits Meet Cold Facts: Are DNA Matches Infallible?,
TRANSCRIPT, Spring 2008, at 32.
67. Id. at 32-33.
68. Linda Geddes, Unreliable Evidence? Time to Open Up DNA Databases, NEW
SCIENTIST, Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20527424.700-
unreliable-evidence-time-to-open- up-dna-databases.html?full =true.
69. Id.
70. OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 32.
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Hispanics.71 Therefore, the discovery of even one match at 9 loci in a
database of only 65,493 profiles is alarming. However, this only
becomes a cause for concern if the size of the database is conflated
with the number of comparisons being made to find a match.72
Charles Brenner, a forensic mathematics consultant, explains:
"There are two separate multiplicative factors that the naive
tend to overlook when considering the number of possible 9-
locus matches from a collection of profiles such as the Arizona
data: 1) the factor, equal to one-half the size of the sample, by
which the number of pairs exceeds the size of the sample, and
2) the combinatorial factor - 715 above- representing the
number of different 9-locus selections from 13, each of which is
an opportunity for two selected individuals to have a 9-locus
match."73
These two factors can be better understood by analyzing "the
birthday problem," which asks how many people you need to have at
a party so that there is more than a 50 percent chance that two of
them will share the same birthday?74 Most people believe the answer
to be 183 - the smallest whole number larger than 365/2 - when the
correct answer is actually 23.7 Having 23 people in a room yields 253
different ways of pairing two people together, which provides many
possibilities of finding a pair with the same birthday.76
The 65,493 profiles in Arizona's DNA database creates
2,144,633,778 distinct pairs, and though there is only one way to
match all 13 loci, there are 715 distinct combinations of nine items out
of thirteen. Assuming that the RMP of a 9 loci match is "1 in 754
million," then the expected number of 9 loci matches would be 2,034,
which reveals that RMPs are even smaller than the theoretical
estimates. In reality, however, each genetic profile has its own RMP
71. David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What is the FBI
Afraid Of?, 19 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 145, 154 (2009).
72. Kaye, supra note 71.
73. CHARLES BRENNER, ARIZONA DNA, DATABASE MATCHES (2007), available at
http://dna-view.com/ArizonaMatch.htm.




77. Kaye, supra note 71, at 157.
78. Id.
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within each population group, and more research is required to
determine whether RMPs are accurate or either too high or too low.7
The RMP is only relevant in assisting the jury measuring the
probative value of a given case's circumstantial evidence.. It answers
the question: How rare is the identified genetic profile in the general
population?" However, because cold hits represent a query for
matches among thousands of DNA profiles rather than for a specific
suspect, many statisticians argue that the relevant question is: What is
the likelihood that the database will spit out an innocent person's
name?8 2 Sir Alec Jeffreys, the original inventor of DNA typing, has
warned that when extremely large databases (such as CODIS and the
NDNAD) undergo large numbers of exploratory searches, even
exceptionally rare matches will occur." In a 1996 report titled "The
Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence," the National Research
Council concluded that the database match probability should be
used to explain the significance of a cold hit DNA match.84 However,
the FBI has ignored this recommendation.8 5
There are a few possible reasons why the DNA database studies
conducted in Arizona, Illinois, and Maryland yielded such high
numbers of matching pairs given the relatively low number of profiles
that comprised each database. One possible reason is duplicate
entries of the same profile, for example if an individual's DNA profile
was entered once under his or her real name and again under his or
her alias. A second possible reason is that the assumptions about
the frequency of alleles in populations, such as by race, ethnicity, or
geography, are incorrect.17 A third possibility is that there are large
numbers of relatives in the database, who are more likely than non-
79. Id. at 158.
80. Kaye, supra note 71, at 150-51.
81. Edward Humes, Guilt by the Numbers, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=900572&evid=1.
82. Id.
83. MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF
DNA FINGERPRINTING 145 (2008).
84. Edward Humes, Guilt by the Numbers, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=900572&evid=1 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUJNCIL, THE EVALU[ATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (National Academy of
Sciences) (1996)).
85. Id.
86. Linda Geddes, Unreliable Evidence? Time to Open Up DNA Databases, NEW
SCIENTIST, Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20527424.700-
unreliable-evidence-time-to-open- up-dna-databases.html?full =true.
87. Id.
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relatives to have similar DNA profiles." The real issue stems from
the fact that while studies similar to the Arizona DNA database study
raise serious concerns about the effectiveness of DNA databases and
the accuracy of RMPs, state and federal governments are resisting
calls to fully investigate the existence of numerous database matches
across 9 or more loci.N9
An Arizona judge barred Barlow from circulating the report on
Arizona's multiple database matches, and the FBI has threatened to
bar crime labs from participating in the national DNA database if
they share database information with anyone outside of law
enforcement.9" Also, a California judge has denied Barlow access to
data about California's DNA database. The problem is that "cold
hit matches that occur within databases do not reflect the same odds
as finding a match within entire populations."92More recently, the
California Supreme Court heard a case in which the prosecution
presented evidence that the odds that a random person unrelated to
the defendant could have left the evidence at the crime scene are one
in 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (sextillion).9 Because the world's
total population is only about seven billion, this was tantamount to
saying that the defendant was guilty. The court held that the
evidence was proper, reasoning that the calculation was a rarity
statistic rather than a calculation reflecting the number of potential
suspects excluded through the database search.94
Access to DNA databases is critical to testing the accuracy of
claims that 13 loci DNA profiles are so rare that they are effectively
unique in the population.' Assessing the rarity of a trait requires
knowledge about the frequency of that trait in a given population. In
2009, 41 scientists and defense lawyers signed a letter to the FBI
demanding access to CODIS so that they can test the underlying
assumptions behind the DNA database statistics that are often used
88. Id.
89. Jefferson, supra note 66, at 33; Edward Humes, Guilt by the Numbers, CAL. LAW.,
Apr. 2009, available at http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=900572&evid=1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 35 (emphasis in original).
93. People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49 (2008).
94. Id. at 66.
95. Roth, supra note 53, at 11.
9 -RoMAN-SANIOs- DNA DAIABASES - 051310 AM.Do (Do NOT DELETE) 5/14/2010 9:37:57 AM
SUMMER 2010] EXPANDING DNA DATABASES 281
to justify convictions.96  The FBI has denied this and earlier requests
for access to CODIS on privacy grounds. However, the signatories
to the letter specifically requested the database "as an electronic file
consisting of the complete genetic profiles ... of every individual in
the database with identifying information removed."8 The privacy
issues deal primarily with retention and potential misuse of DNA
samples and not the genetic profiles that make up CODIS. If
personal identifiers are removed and only anonymous genetic profiles
are released, the potential threat to individuals becomes non-existent.
Those opposed to granting researchers access to CODIS also
argue that doing so constitutes a breach of informed consent - the
right to consent or refuse to take part in research." However,
informed consent regarding receipt of medical treatments or
participation in research involving human subjects involves "the
rights to be free from intentional bodily harm, from offensive
touching or intrusion, from unnecessary confinement and physical
restraint, and from serious and reasonable emotional distress."""'
These rights are not implicated when DNA samples are legally
compelled, and especially when releasing this information will be
"used solely to ensure that the very system that justifies this
compulsion is working as it should.""" Therefore, lack of individual
consent to release anonymous genetic profiles to researchers is an
insufficient reason to block access to CODIS.
The DNA Identification Act of 1994, which is the legislation that
established the NDIS, explicitly allows database records to be made
available "for a population statistics database, for identification
research and protocol development purpose, or for quality control
purposes" as long as all personally identifiable information is first
removed. 1)2 President Obama is also concerned with scientific
integrity, stating in a March 9, 2009, memorandum to the heads of
executive departments and agencies that "if scientific and




98. Keith Inman, Criminal Justice Administration department at California State
University, Hawyard, Presentation at University of California Hastings College of the Law
called "The Scientific Basis of Forensic DNA" (Nov. 10, 2009).
99. Kaye, supra note 71, at 169.
100. Id. at 170.
101. Id. at 169-70.
102. 42 U.S.C. A. §§ 14132(a), 14132(b)(3)(D) (West 2010).
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technological information is developed and used by the Federal
Government, it should ordinarily be made available to the public.""
In addition, a National Research Council report openly criticized how
insular forensic science is, detached from the conventional norms of
the scientific process. 14 The fact that providing researchers with
access to CODIS is authorized by Congress and supported by the
President and the National Research Council, combined with the
failed arguments of privacy and consent to block access, makes the
FBI's reluctance to do so seem like they have something to hide. The
use of DNA evidence in the criminal justice system is a science. One
of the fundamental maxims in science is that hypotheses must be
tested, and open access to data will allow for the independent
scientific scrutiny that normally occurs during the peer review and
publication process.
Allowing researchers to access CODIS will facilitate future
studies to determine whether the number of matches arising from the
evaluation of individual state DNA databases can be reconciled with
the fundamental assumptions that scientists rely upon when
calculating the frequency of genetic profiles. More transparency is
essential to keeping the system fair and honest, and to preventing
innocent people from being sent to prison." Proponents of DNA
databases argue that DNA typing is accurate and provides conclusive
evidence of guilt, as supported by the DNA statistics presented to a
jury in a criminal trial. The problem is that DNA statistics can be
misleading due to such things like failing to consider the potential for
error, failing to consider relatives, improperly analyzing a mixed
sample containing DNA from more than one individual, and
statistical fallacies. The impact of such misunderstanding can be quite
grave, considering that a defendant's life and liberty are on the line.
The call to expand the DNA database - given the problems
associated with how the database is used in our criminal justice
system - makes the serious privacy implications associated with such
expansion more controversial because it is unclear whether the
interest of justice is actually being served.
103. Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Mar 9, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09/.
104. D.E. Krane et. al., Time for DNA Disclosure, 326 Science 1631 (Dec. 18, 2009).
105. Edward Humes, Guilt by the Numbers, CAL. LAW., Apr. 2009, available at
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=900572&evid=1.
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VI. DNA Database Statutes in the United States
Though common themes exist, all 50 states and the federal
government have enacted separate statutes creating DNA
databases." As of January 2009, all 50 states have statutes requiring
DNA samples to be collected from convicted felons, but they differ
based on state-qualifying offenses." For example, while 47 states
require DNA samples from all convicted felons, the statutes of 40
states apply retroactively to those already incarcerated prior to the
statutes' effective dates and 32 states require DNA samples from
adults and juveniles alike." Additionally, 37 states have statutes
requiring DNA samples from those convicted of sex-crime
misdemeanors, 5 of which also require DNA samples from those
convicted of numerous other misdemeanors as well.1 o9
In efforts to expand DNA databases, 21 states have statutes
requiring DNA samples from those arrested for murder or sex crimes,
19 of which additionally require DNA samples from those arrested
for burglary."" The federal government and California, along with 10
other states, require DNA samples from those arrested for any
felony."' If charges are dropped, dismissed, or if the arrestee is found
not guilty, 12 states provide expungement of the DNA profile upon
request and 8 states expunge the DNA profile automatically. 112
Minnesota is an exception because state legislation provides for
automatic expungement of a DNA profile upon a finding of not guilty
and expungement upon request of a DNA profile if the charges were
dismissed or dropped.11 3
In early 2009, pursuant to the 2005 DNA Fingerprint Act, the
federal government approved a plan to collect DNA samples from
106. Validity, Construction, and Operation of State DNA Database Statutes, 76
A.L.R.5D 239, at § 2(b) (2009); Tim Schellberg, Gordon Thomas Honeywell
Governmental Affairs, Presentation at ISFE Conference: Forensic DNA Databases: A
Global Update (Nov. 10, 2009).
107. DNA Resource.com, State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses,




110. DNA Resource.com, State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases,




113. DNA Resource.com, State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases, supra note 110.
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undocumented immigrants, but the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (a division of Homeland Security) was not collecting
DNA from detained immigrants as of August 2009.'4 Those who
oppose this law argue that most undocumented immigrants are held
for suspected violations of civil law and therefore should not be
entered into a criminal database, and collecting DNA from
immigrants does not serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose
because most are hard-working people."5
A. Legal Challenges
Several courts have held that enforcing a state DNA database
statute does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, nor does it violate the Fifth Amendment
right against self incrimination because DNA samples are not
considered to be testimonial in nature."' Courts have also upheld
DNA database statutes that are intended or permitted to apply to
persons convicted prior to the enactment of the relevant database
statute.
Regarding the Fourth Amendment, several courts have
expressed the view that a state's DNA database statute does not
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those persons subject to the
statute, reasoning that such an intrusion is reasonable in light of the
need to ensure public safety and prisoners' diminished expectation of
privacy."' The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in an
Eleventh Circuit case holding that Georgia's DNA database statute
does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution because
the public safety outweighed the minor intrusion involved in taking
prisoners' saliva samples, given the prisoners' reduced expectation of
privacy in their identities."' Similarly, the Court has also denied
certiorari in a Second Circuit case holding that New York's DNA
database statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the
114. Emily Witt & Ben Protess, DNA Testing of Detained Immigrants Easier Said
Than Done, PROPUBLICA, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/dna-testing-of-
detained-immigrants-easier-said-than-done-805.
115. Id.
116. Validity, Construction, and Operation of State DNA Database Statutes, 76
A.L.R.5D 239, at §§ 3 and 11 (2009).
117. Id. at §22.
118. Id. at §§ 10, 14-16 (no violation under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
special needs exception, and prisoners' reduced privacy exception).
119. Boulineau v. Donald, 546 U.S. 820 (2005); see Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273
(11th Cir. 2005).
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Constitution because it falls within the "special needs" exception -
the notion that collecting DNA samples from prisoners is beyond the
normal need for criminal law enforcement, making the warrant and
or probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
impracticable or irrelevant.') By denying certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court is implicitly affirming the rulings of the Second and
Eleventh Circuits. This will make it more challenging for those
opposing DNA database statutes on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Even when a relatively clear Fourth Amendment violation
results in an individual's DNA profile being placed in the DNA
database, courts may nonetheless choose not to apply the
exclusionary rule. Nine years ago, Earl Whittley Davis was a
shooting victim whose DNA profile was subsequently uploaded into
CODIS even though he had done nothing wrong.121 This victim then
became the subject of a cold case hit for a murder that occurred in
2004.122 Although the Maryland District Court found that crime
control was a generalized interest that did not outweigh Davis'
privacy when placement of his DNA profile in CODIS was not in
response to a warrant or to an applicable statute, the Court held that
the DNA evidence was nonetheless admissible.123 The Court
reasoned that placement of Davis' profile in CODIS was not reckless,
flagrant or systematic, that exclusion would result in only marginal
deterrence, if any, and that any deterrent effect would be greatly
outweighed by the cost of suppressing "powerfully inculpatory and
reliable DNA evidence." 12 4 This case should lead people to fear that
utilizing such practices to expand the DNA database would open a
backdoor to population-wide data banking.15
120. Nicholas v. Goord, 549 U.S. 953 (2006); see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2d
Cir. 2005).
121. Fourth Amendment.com, Cold Case Hit of DNA from a Shooting victim 9 Years
Ago was Unreasonable Seizure, but Exclusionary Rule Not Applied (2009),
http://fourthamendment.com/blog/index.php?blog= 1&title =dmd cold case hit of dna f
rom a shootin&more= 1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 (last visited April 19, 2010).
122. Id.
123. United States v. Davis, RWT 07-0199, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83864, at *87 (D.
Md. September 15, 2009).
124. United States v. Davis, RWT 07-0199, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83864 at *98-100.
125. United States v. Davis, RWT 07-0199, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83864 at *90 (citing
Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76
Wash. L. Rev. 413 (2001)).
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B. The Issue of Including Arrestees in a DNA Database
The U.S. Constitution has not been held to necessarily preclude
the inclusion of arrestees in a DNA database. 126 However, reasons for
upholding the requirement of collecting DNA samples from convicts
cannot necessarily be used to justify requiring the collection of DNA
samples from arrestees. For example, the consequences of an arrest
are not as severe as those of a conviction, and an arrest is not the
equivalent of guilt. Therefore, arrestees should not have a reduced
privacy interest. Some arrestees have not been convicted of any
crime, nor may they ever be, and if the police reasonably suspect an
individual arrestee then they can and should seek a warrant for a
DNA sample. 2 7
Another issue regarding taking DNA samples from arrestees is
expungement. Critics argue that the databank should bear the
responsibility of ensuring that DNA samples that do not belong in the
database are removed, however most states that require collection of
DNA samples from arrestees make the individuals responsible for
ensuring the expungement of their DNA profiles and the destruction
of their DNA samples.' 8 For example, an individual who is eligible
for expungement in California would have to send a formal request to
the trial court where he or she was arrested, the California
Department of Justice's DNA Laboratory, and the prosecuting
attorney, and no appeal process is available if the court denies the
request.1 9
The Orange County District Attorney's Office has begun
offering to drop charges for mere arrestees of nonviolent
misdemeanors in exchange for a DNA sample."" Critics argue that
this practice is tantamount to pressuring people who have not been
convicted of any crime to give the government a DNA sample, and
that people will do so to avoid a potentially prolonged and
challenging relationship with the legal system even if they are truly
innocent."
126. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 258.
127. Simoncelli, supra note 52, at 204.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.? A DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/17/local/me-oc-
dnal7.
131. Abdollah, supra note 130.
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The UK NDNAD contains almost five million samples, and
almost one million of them are known to be of innocent people. 32
The UK has implemented an official policy of arresting people for the
sole purpose of obtaining their DNA, which reflects a system that
presumes guilt even before an actual crime has been committed.13
Though such a practice violates the American principle of an
individual being presumed innocent until proven guilty, the U.S.
Supreme Court and state Supreme Courts may consider pretextual
police behavior acceptable, effectively giving law enforcement carte
blanche authority to expand DNA databases.1 4
C. Consequences of Poor Implementation
Poor implementation of a state DNA database statute can lead
to significant problems. One example is Maryland's backup system
for its DNA database involving downloading the database onto a tape
each evening, which an employee takes home and returns the next
morning. Not only does this system make sensitive information
vulnerable to unauthorized access, but if anything should happen to
the main computer system or hard drive, critical data would be lost
and not easily recovered."' A second example is the fact that
approximately 50,000 felons have been released from Illinois prisons
or county probation without submitting DNA samples as required by
law due to delays in the law's implementation.1  A third example is
the recent disclosure that an audit of Wisconsin's statewide DNA
database revealed that the profiles of at least 12,000 felons were
missing, 70 percent of which are believed to still be in custody or
132. Ligali, Police Illegally Obtaining DNA to Create Pre-Crime Suspects,
http://www.ligali.org/article.php?id =2024 (last visited April 19, 2010).
133. Id.
134. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that traffic stops for
violation of a traffic law is valid even if the officer would not have stopped the motorist
except for some other law enforcement objective); see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest
for minor criminal offense); see Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1994) (holding
that the police may trick suspects into giving DNA samples for one investigation by asking
them to give DNA samples for unrelated investigations).
135. Ralph Brave, DNA To Go, BALT. CITY PAPER, Jul. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.citypaper.com/news/story.asp?id= 8628.
136. Id.
137. Megan Twohey, DNA Law Misses 50,000 Felons Released in Illinois, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-dna-
crack-in -law-01 -sep01,0,1218869.story.
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under state supervision."' A suspect in a string of murders that
occurred from 1986 to 2007 was a convicted felon whose DNA profile
should have been in the state's database, and the police might have
focused on him sooner if it had been. These examples demonstrate
how effective implementation is critical to realizing the public safety
goals that a DNA database statute is meant to achieve.
VII. Pros and Cons of DNA Databases
DNA may be more objective and accurate than other forensic
disciplines that rely heavily on subjective judgments and
interpretations, but DNA is not infallible and can be corrupted by
environmental factors (e.g., heat, sunlight, bacteria) and is subject to
human error or fraud in comparing samples taken from suspects with
samples removed from a crime scene. Proponents claim that a
DNA database is not intended to replace conventional criminal
investigations but to complement them by identifying potential
suspects sooner who can then be further investigated using more
conventional means.'14( However, there is a serious risk that evidence
tending to prove the innocence of a suspect may be overlooked in
light of DNA evidence because people will be blinded by the
science.14' Even though forensic DNA has been used to exonerate
people who have been wrongly convicted, it would be ironic if the
same evidence is used to create injustices of its own.142
Advocates of DNA databases claim that obtaining a DNA
sample for a government database does not raise privacy concerns
because the procedure for taking a DNA sample is less invasive than
that required for taking blood. 143 A number of complications may
arise during the blood collection process, including fainting, incorrect
needle insertion, bruising, and excessive bleeding.144  Another
argument to counter privacy concerns is that personal information is
already held by groups in the private sector, and if people can trust
138. Assoc. Press, DNA Profiles of Many Felons are Missing in Wisconsin, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 16, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/us/17wisconsin.html?_r=1.
139. THE INT'L DEBATE EDUC. Ass'N, THE DEBATABASE BOOK: A MUST HAVE
GUIDE FOR SUCCESSFUL DEBATE 84 (4th ed. 2009).
140. Id. at 85.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 85-86.
143. THE INT'L DEBATE EDUC. Ass'N, supra note 139, at 85.
144. Health Sciences Division, Austin Community College, Complications in Blood
Collection 66 (2004), available at http://www.austincc.edu/health/phb/documents/PHBLec8
ComplicationsinBloodCollectionSum04.pdf.
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the private sector then they should be able to trust the government. 145
However, the invasiveness of the database and source of privacy
concerns is the fact that DNA samples are retained.146 Individuals
who provide their own personal information to the private sector do
so voluntarily, and usually in exchange for a service (e.g., insurance
brokers require an extensive medical history of their clients before
approving insurance coverage, mortgage lenders demand a full credit
record of each applicant before approving loans). DNA database
statutes make providing a DNA sample mandatory while offering
nothing in return.148 In addition, American discontent with political
leaders, lack of faith in the political system, poor government
performance, and the overall condition of the nation are key factors
behind public distrust of the government.149 Thus, arguments that the
government should be entrusted with private and personal
information may fall on deaf ears.
Supporters of expanding the DNA database argue that to
suppress DNA usages because they might become abuses is akin to
arguing that we should not allow rapid trains to be built because they
might be used to transport victims to concentration camps."" There
are many uses of DNA that do not raise significant concerns, such as
creating a DNA profile of a suspect after he or she has been
identified, but obtaining and retaining DNA profiles and samples
from innocent people is not one of them. With government efforts to
expand the national DNA database, critics worry that the U.S. is
becoming a genetic surveillance society. Benjamin Keehn, a public
defender in Boston, argued on PBS NewsHour that "if we are going
to take DNA from prisoners because they are at-risk [of committing
crimes in the future], why shouldn't we take DNA from teenagers,
from homeless people, from Catholic priests, from any subgroup of





149. THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, How
AMERICANS VIEW GOVERNMENT: DECONSTRUCTING DISTRUST, 13 (1998), http://
people-press.org/reports/pdf/95.pdf.
150. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 198.
151. Solomon Moore, F.B.L and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/I9DNA.html?_r=1.
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at-risk?" 152 As time passes, science advances, and the scope and usage
of DNA databases grow, the line being drawn between what is and is
not acceptable will encroach more and more on individual privacy.
VIII. Privacy Implications of DNA
Privacy is not threatened by the means of obtaining DNA
samples, but rather the information inherent in DNA and the
individual's lack of control over such information. There are few
subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy
interests than that of an individual's health or genetic make-up.1 54
The concern is that as the uses for and access to the DNA database
increases, the threat to privacy also increases.'"
DNA samples have been analogized to medical information
stored on a computer disk because both can be "read" by the
application of technology. 6 Though medical information may be
strongly correlated with particular diseases, DNA is inherently linked
to one person (except in the case of identical twins).'17 An
individual's medical information may change over the course of his or
her lifetime (e.g., people being diagnosed with diabetes, asthma, high
cholesterol, or heart disease well into adulthood), but with the
exception of mutations, DNA does not change over time. An
individual's medical information may have implications for others
(e.g., a virus infection has implications for others as the infected
person may get others sick), just as DNA has implications for
individuals other than the person from whom the information was
derived.' However, the implications of medical information are not
as serious as those of DNA, which involve invading the privacy of a
person's family when no family member is guilty of any wrongdoing.
Close relatives such as parents, siblings and children share about fifty
152. Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
Spring 2003, at 37, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA01-Rosen.pdf.
153. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 226.
154. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998).
155. See KRISTINA STALEY, THE POLICE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE: BALANCING
CRIME DETECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 36 (2005), available at
http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NationalDNADat
abase.pdf.
156. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 137-38.
157. Id. at 152.
158. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 152.
159. Id. at 151-152.
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percent of each other's genetic variants and STR lengths, and more
distant relatives such as uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, grandparents,
grandchildren, and half-siblings share about twenty-five percent of
each other's DNA variants.6 " Thus, using partial matches to identify
potential suspects radically expands the power and purpose of DNA
databases, implicating a number of people who may have nothing to
do with the original crime.
There are substantial differences between DNA profiles and
ordinary fingerprints and it trivializes DNA to call a DNA profile a
genetic fingerprint."' Fingerprints are two-dimensional representa-
tions of the physical attributes of fingertips and provide no
information about a person other than identity.112 In addition to
providing an individual's identity, DNA can also provide medical
characteristics, physical attributes, who the individual may be related
to, and other personal information that, in the wrong hands, can
perpetuate discriminatory practices. 63  Whereas a latent fingerprint
provides a fixed amount of information, all of which is used by the
forensic scientist, a DNA sample provides a wealth of information
and the forensic scientist has substantial control over the amount of
information to be obtained from the sample. 64 DNA is more
probative than fingerprints because unlike fingerprints which
establish that a suspect was present at a location and does not
automatically imply guilt, it is more difficult to advance innocent
reasons for the presence of DNA in the form of bodily fluids."' These
differences are relevant to how DNA databases should be used and
maintained, especially considering the privacy concerns unique to
DNA.
Proponents of DNA databases claim that DNA profiles consist
merely of "junk DNA" that is incapable of revealing information
about an individual's genetic make-up or health.6 However, a
British team has discovered that the standard DNA profile contains a
160. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders' Kin (Part I), 34J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 251-252 (2006).
161. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 173.
162. Id.
163. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, at
113 (National Academy of Sciences) (1992), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=0309045878 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
164. Id. at 112.
165. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE,
supra note 163, at 112.
166. David Concar, What's in a Fingerprint, NEW SCIENTIST, May 5, 2009, at 9.
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subtle signature which can be linked to a person's susceptibility to
type 1 diabetes. This research was buried in an academic paper, did
not comment on the implications for forensic science, and has been
overlooked by the forensic and legal communities."' DNA forensic
testing relies on the principle that DNA profiles are only useful for
identification, which is how people justify storing DNA profiles on
law enforcement computers because they do not infringe anyone's
medical privacy."' Sir Alec Jeffreys was a member of the research
team that made this discovery, and he predicted that "further
troubling links between DNA fingerprints and disease will emerge as
scientists probe the completed draft of the human genome."'o
The U.S. has failed to employ comprehensive privacy regulations
that would prevent the government from sharing DNA profiles in a
DNA database with other groups, such as insurance companies,
employers, or academia.17' DNA database statutes can be grouped
into broad categories based on authorized uses of both DNA profiles
and raw DNA samples: 1) statutes that allow access to DNA for non-
law enforcement purposes, 2) statutes that allow access to DNA
information to public officials other than law enforcement, 3) statutes
that allow law enforcement to use DNA evidence for purposes other
than identification, and 4) statutes that do not require expungement
of DNA records upon reversal. 172 Some state laws, such as
Massachusetts, Louisiana and North Carolina, include a vague, open-
ended authorization that allows the database to be used for "other
humanitarian purposes." 1 Alabama's statute explicitly authorizes
the creation and use of a DNA population statistical database "to
provide data relative to the causation, detection and prevention of
disease or disability," as well as to assist in educational or medical
research.174 Mississippi's law authorizes the Mississippi Crime




170. Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
Spring 2003, at 37, 37, available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA01-
Rosen.pdf.
171. Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2213958/.
172. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 176.
173. Id.; Simoncelli, supra note 52, at 203.
174. Simoncelli, supra note 52, at 203.
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insurance companies, psychologists, and other third parties with
access to information in the state DNA database.
Some argue that creating a whole-population database is logical
because a larger database is more useful than a smaller one, and it has
the added effect of purging racial bias from the system, thereby
avoiding criticisms of discrimination that result from selective
sampling of the population.1 7' However, this alone is insufficient to
justify a whole-population database, and for many the critical factor is
not merely the creation of a whole-population database of genetic
profiles, but the retention of all of the DNA samples used to generate
the genetic profiles. The potential for the government to use the
DNA samples for a purpose not originally conceived of at the time
that the DNA sample was obtained is frightening. The problem of
function creep will be explored in the next section.
The United States, Germany, and other countries have been
guilty of implementing national programs in the name of eugenics
that clearly violated human rights.177 The eugenics movement lost
credibility after the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, but re-emerged as a
scientific endeavor and social issue following the advent of
biotechnology in the 1970s. Science fiction literature and movies
have dealt with the issue of "new eugenics" - the use of technology to
make directed changes to human evolution.179 These works convey
the danger that the ability to manipulate an individual's genetic
makeup will result in removing physical and behavioral traits not
desired by society as a whole."" The movie GATTACA is an
example projecting, from current knowledge and technology, a world
where the new eugenics is a reality."' If researchers are able to access
the DNA profiles or DNA samples accumulated pursuant to a DNA
database statute, they will inevitably try to identify the genes
responsible for particular traits. Thousands of citizens would
essentially be contributing to this future reality without their
knowledge or consent. This reality is not as far off as some may
175. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 177.
176. HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, NOTHING TO HIDE, NOTHING TO FEAR?:
BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE GOVERNANCE
AND USE OF THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE 74-75 (2009).
177. THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 17 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997).
178. David A. Kirby, The New Eugenics in Cinema: Genetic Determinism and Gene
Therapy in "GA TTA CA," 27 SCIENCE FICTION STUDIES 193, 195 (2000).
179. Kirby, supra note 178.
180. Id. at 196.
181. Id. at 199.
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think. President George W. Bush enacted the Newborn Screening
Lives Act in April 2008, which mandates the screening of the DNA of
all newborn babies in the U.S., and sections of the bill make it clear
that the DNA may be retained and later used in genetic experiments
and tests.182 In addition, all 50 states now routinely provide the results
of such tests to the Department of Homeland Security."' The
National Conference of State Legislatures has created a list of the
various statutes or regulatory provisions by state under which
newborns' DNA is being collected.18 4
IX. Function Creep
State and federal DNA database statutes include no provisions
for destroying DNA samples once a DNA profile for inclusion in
CODIS has been generated."' Proponents of forensic DNA testing
claim that retaining DNA samples is necessary because science and
technology is constantly improving and these samples may yield more
information in the future.""' Paul Ferrara, Director of Virginia's DNA
program, additionally claims that retaining DNA samples is necessary
so that agencies can rerun DNA profiles to verify cold hits before
notifying law enforcement agencies to further investigate, and that
agencies encounter many different situations requiring consultation
with original database samples.
The term function creep refers to the "operationally driven use of
the existing resource for new purposes not envisaged when the
resource was established," which is "made possible by technological
innovation and lack of inhibiting measures" like public opposition or
legislation."' Historically, databases that were created in the U.S. for
182. Steve Watson, "Bush Signs Bill to Take All Newborns' DNA," Infowars.net, May
2, 2008, available at http://www.infowars.net/articles/may2008/020507DNA.htm.
183. Id.
184. National Conference of State Legislatures, Newborn Genetic and Metabolic
Disease Screening, available at http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/Newborn
GeneticandMetabolicScreeningLaws/tabid/14416/Default.aspx (last visited April 19, 2010).
185. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 190.
186. Id. at 215.
187. Paul Ferrara, Director, Virginia DNA Program, Proceedings of the National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (Jul. 26, 1999).
188. HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, NOTHING TO HIDE, NOTHING TO FEAR?:
BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE GOVERNANCE
AND USE OF THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE 39 (2009).
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a discrete purpose were eventually assigned new functions and
purposes. 9
The government began issuing drivers licenses in the name of
public safety, and yet the average adult American citizen now has
more direct dealings with government through licensing and
regulation of the automobile than through any other single public
activity.1 9 Eventually, states began earning millions of dollars per
year from selling drivers' personal information to direct marketers,
charities, political campaigns and various commercial interests.'"' An
unintended consequence of this practice was the real threat to public
safety. In some instances, abuse of drivers' personal information lead
to murders.192 Congress reacted by passing the Drivers Privacy
Protection Act, which effectively prohibits the disclosure of personal
information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record for
unauthorized uses unless the individual waives his or her right to
privacy."3 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, reasoning that it is a proper
exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under
the Commerce Clause and does not violate principles of federalism
contained in the Tenth Amendment. 194
The government introduced social security numbers (SSNs) to
track individuals' accounts within the Social Security Program in
1935.'9 Executive Order 9397, issued in 1943, expanded its use by
requiring federal agencies to use SSNs exclusively whenever a new
identification system for individuals needed to be created.9
Eventually, the Internal Revenue Service adopted the SSN as its
official taxpayer identification number and the Department of
189. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 174.
190. Carl Watner, The Precursor of National Identification Cards in the U.S.: Drivers
Licenses and Vehicle Registration in Historical Perspective, available at http://www.
voluntaryist.com/articles/1 I 9a.php.
191. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Ban on States' Sales of Drivers' License
Information, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/
13/us/justices-uphold-ban-on-states-sales-of-drivers-license-information.html.
192. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Drivers Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA) and the Privacy of Your state Motor Vehicle Record, http://epic.
org/privacy/drivers/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721 (West 2009).
193. Id.
194. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
195. Social Security Online: The Official Website of the U.S. Social Security
Administration, Social Security Number Policy Chronology, http://www.
socialsecurity.gov/history/ssn/ssnchron.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
196. Id.
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Defense began using SSNs to identify Armed Forces personnel. 117
Then during the 1970s, the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions
Act required all financial institutions to obtain the SSNs of all of their
customers, the Privacy Act authorized local governments to use SSNs,
and the Tax Reform Act authorized registration authorities of a state
or local tax, welfare, driver's license, or motor vehicle registration to
use SSNs to establish identities.!" Finally, in 1987, the Social Security
Administration began automatically issuing SSNs to newborns when
the birth was registered by the State, and currently all 50 states, plus
Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico, participate in this program.
Once intended to track individuals' accounts within the Social
Security Program, SSNs have become a universal identifier for
individuals within the U.S.
The U.S. Constitution expressly states that "an enumeration shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of
the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years in
such Manner as they shall by Law direct." 21o Census records are a
constitutional requirement used to allocate congressional seats,
electoral votes and government program funding. Though the
Constitution only requires a head count, a substantial amount of data
is collected during a census.20 More and more detailed information
has been gathered over the years, including data on race/ancestry,
health, housing, and transportation.20 After the Japanese Attack on
Pearl Harbor, census records were used to facilitate the internment of
Japanese-Americans. Presently, however, census data cannot be
used for any purpose other than its intended statistical purposes, and
no federal agency is allowed to access census reports.
The Texas Tribune recently published a story about how the
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DNA samples to an Armed Forces lab "to build a national and,
someday, international mitochondrial DNA registry." 205 However,
the newborn blood samples were stored without parental consent and
records uncovered government efforts to limit the public's knowledge
of the state newborn blood program.26 Parents sued officials over
these actions, but the state settled the case quickly before anything
could be revealed in the discovery phase.207
As of 2004, the Department of Defense ("DOD") had collected
three million biological samples from service personnel "for the
stated purpose of identifying remains or body parts of a soldier killed
on duty." 208 However, samples are retained for fifty years, which
greatly exceeds the subjects' time with the military. Further
compounding the issue, the DOD has refused to establish regulations
to guard against third parties accessing the accumulated biological
samples.2091 It is not hard to foresee pressures mounting to use these
biological samples for purposes other than identifying soldiers killed
on duty, such as identifying criminal suspects and medical research.2
Although there is a Fourth Amendment concern associated with
obtaining DNA samples, the Fourth Amendment applies only to
government action and is inapplicable to private parties who do not
act as agents of the government." This doctrine, however, does not
preclude the possibility that law enforcement may be able to access
existing repositories of DNA from cooperative private hospitals or
laboratories, provided that the government had no involvement in
how the DNA was originally obtained and that the state is not
212
engaging in any search or seizure in acquiring DNA in this way.
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission estimated that as of
1998, more than 282 million human biological specimens were
collected and stored in the U.S. for research studies, newborn
screening tests, organ banks, blood banks, forensic DNA databases,
and for other purposes, which increases at a rate of 20 million samples
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per year.213 The issue lies in the fact that an individual undergoing
diagnostic tests or donating samples for clinical or research purposes
has a reasonable expectation of privacy that their test results and
DNA will not be shared with a non-medical third party without his or
her consent. 14
Function creep has already begun with DNA databases as law
enforcement has expanded DNA collection to include new categories
of people.21' Examples of future uses of DNA databases include
research to increase understanding of patterns of criminal behavior,
research to correlate genetic variation with disposition to certain
behaviors, and creation of a universal database by combining all
existing databases to facilitate data sharing. 1'
X. Conclusion
DNA database statutes provide inadequate privacy protections.
There is a lack of national oversight, no uniform quality control
process of obtaining DNA samples and maintaining DNA databases,
and there is no consistency regarding who may access DNA databases
and for what reasons. DNA is a useful crime-fighting tool, but its
potential makes it likely to be abused. Because DNA databases
already exist, it is hard to imagine that their viability will diminish in
the future. Therefore, leaders must work to ensure that all DNA
profiles and DNA samples are used for the limited purpose for which
they were collected, and advocates should push for the eventual
destruction of all DNA samples once DNA profiles have been
generated so that no one will be tempted to use them for purposes
that go beyond forensic identification.
The way cold hit statistics are used to determine guilt or
innocence in litigation is another area of potential abuse.
Increasingly, convictions are relying on DNA evidence alone.
Moreover, when the DNA evidence is a partial match on less than 13
loci, the risk of injustice is greater, as evidenced by the report of
Arizona's DNA database in 2005. It is frightening that most people
are blinded by a belief that DNA is the panacea of crime detection
213. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999).
214. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
215. DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 174.
216. HUMAN GENETICS COMMISSION, NOTHING TO HIDE, NOTHING TO FEAR?:
BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE GOVERNANCE
AND USE OF THE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE 81-85 (2009).
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and do not recognize the potential threat to privacy and other civil
liberties. Researchers should be provided with access to the genetic
profiles within CODIS after all of the personal identifiers have been
removed so that they can conduct independent scientific scrutiny to
ensure the scientific integrity of DNA forensic science.
The NDNAD in the UK is even more controversial than the
DNA databases in the U.S. Despite negative media coverage and
successful legal challenges to DNA collection and retention practices,
British leaders are forging ahead with the hope of one day expanding
the database to cover the entire UK population.
Given the history of eugenics and discrimination in the U.S. and
abroad and the atrocities that have befallen millions of innocent
human beings, everyone should be aware of and fear the dangers
associated with becoming a genetic surveillance society. If people are
not vocal in opposing current DNA database practices, the only
people who will be shaping the future of how DNA is used are those
with a political agenda who are not as concerned with individual
privacy and the ethics of their actions. As science and technology
continue to advance, visions of a brave new world that are the
substance of science fiction movies like GATTACA may no longer be
a distant reality.
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